A Brief History of Britain 1851–2010 Read online

Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to treat empire as an expression of class interest, a view that was to be adopted then and subsequently by many left-wing critics. Instead, support for imperial activities crossed social divides. Thus, the Protestant churches of Britain devoted their resources to missionary activity outside Europe, particularly, though not only, within the empire, and not to proselytism on the Continent. Moreover, to criticize attitudes to empire, as if Britain could have been abstracted from the contemporary situation elsewhere, is unhelpful and is also, as with much subsequent criticism of the Victorian period, profoundly ahistorical. Furthermore, within the constraints of the attitudes of the age, the British were more liberal than other major European powers. The contrast between the British treatment of the Zulu and the genocidal German response to resistance by the Herero in Namibia, was, and is, readily apparent.

  There was also an economic dimension to this imperialism, one that entailed a liberal commitment to free trade as well as the pursuit of power politics. Britain traded abroad far more than the Continental countries, and far more widely, and a sense of maritime destiny was linked to adventure and pride. In his Just So Stories (1902), Kipling wrote ‘weekly from Southampton,| Great steamers white and gold,| Go rolling down to Rio|’. Britain’s major industrial sectors – textiles and metal products – were dependent on exports and their markets were both imperial and non-imperial, with India and Germany respectively being key markets.

  This dependency was related to other aspects of Britain’s distinctiveness: the degree to which the country was outward-looking and internationalist; the interest in peace (which was believed to create the best conditions for trade); and the opposition to a large, expensive Army and to compulsory military service, both of which were seen by many as products of authoritarianism and as likely to sustain a state power judged unacceptable to the political libertarianism of British society. The US shared this opposition to conscription, which, however, was the norm on the Continent.

  There were significant similarities with the US, but the British attitude towards America was ambivalent, and vice versa. While Oscar Wilde toured the US in 1882–3, many prominent Victorians wrote about the country, including Dickens, Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke (1843–1911), Trollope and the Liberal politician and intellectual James Bryce (1838–1922), all of whom were taken by its energy and drive, yet often shocked by its ‘vulgar’ (populist) politics. Later, J.B. Priestley was also to be engaged by the energy but to deplore what he saw as the emptiness of American culture.

  In the Victorian period, a standard means of criticizing a politician was to accuse him of the ‘Americanization’ of British politics, and Gladstone and Joseph Chamberlain both suffered accordingly. Moreover, the American Civil War (1861–5) divided British public opinion. The Confederacy (south) sought to win diplomatic recognition from Britain, but fears that recognition would lead to war with the Union (north) prevented the step. There were also disputes with the US over clashing imperial interests, for example in the Pacific over Hawaii and Samoa in the 1890s, and cultural and economic rivalries, as over copyright law in the 1850s. On the other hand, differences over the Canadian border were handled without conflict, there was massive investment in the US, particularly in railways, the transfer of British technology, and important cultural and social links.

  Empire meanwhile changed the details of British life in many respects, not least the diet. Tea from India, taken with milk, replaced China tea and became the basic drink for both polite men and women, in turn encouraging the import of sugar from the West Indies. Gin was mixed with quinine-rich tonic water, a drink developed to provide resistance to malaria in India. Indian words also entered the language, and games such as badminton and polo were introduced from India.

  Territorial expansion provided raw materials for British industry, such as tin from Malaya, as well as markets and employment and, combined with evangelicalism, encouraged a sense of Britain as at the cutting edge of civilization. The economic value of colonies increased as steamships and railways aided economic integration, while the cultural and ideological factors focused on the attraction of empire were such that imperialism became normative. This drew on a sense of mission, as well as triumphalism, racialism and cultural arrogance, all supporting a belief that the West was unbeatable and was bringing civilization to a benighted world – not least by ending what were seen as uncivilized as well as un-Christian practices, such as widow-burning and ritual banditry (thuggee) in India. Yet, Queen Victoria’s Proclamation to the People of India of 1858 repudiated any right or desire to impose Christianity on her subjects and promised all, irrespective of religion, the rights of law, although this did not stop missionary activity. On her state visits to Ireland in 1861 and 1900, the queen met the heads of the Catholic hierarchy. This was a long way from the conspicuous Protestantist Reformation monarchy.

  The net result was a national commitment to imperial rule and experience that encouraged persistence in spreading and sustaining trans-oceanic control in the face of adversity and often grave difficulties. Britain’s role was part of the wider story of European imperialism; but it was far greater than that of any other state, because of the limited part she played in European power politics, her unprecedented naval and commercial strength, and the already extensive character of the empire when the period started.

  The Wars of the 1850s

  The two major conflicts of the 1850s underlined potential challenges to the British empire. The crushing Russian naval victory over the Turkish off Sinope in the Black Sea in 1853 exacerbated long-standing concerns about the weakness of the Turkish empire and about possible Russian domination in the Black Sea and the Balkans. Employing the geopolitical ideas of the day, British commentators saw the prospect of Russian advances as a threat to the overland route to India, although they considerably exaggerated this threat. The British government greatly distrusted Napoleon III of France and his intentions, but joined with France in seeking to limit Russian expansion.

  The war focused on naval and amphibious action against the Russians. Allied naval operations in the Baltic threatened St Petersburg, while a full-scale amphibious expedition was sent to the Crimea in order to capture the naval base of Sevastopol, which seemed a way to protect Turkey from naval attack. However, landing on 14 September 1854, the Allies began the campaign late without having properly assessed the difficulty of the task, and they lacked the necessary manpower. The siege of Sevastopol was not fully effective as road links to the north of the port remained open – a consequence of the lack of sufficient Allied troops to mount a comprehensive blockade. The Allies also had to face both particularly bad weather, which hit supply links across the Black Sea, as well as attempts by the Russian army in the Crimea to disrupt the siege.

  The Russians mounted unsuccessful attacks on the ports through which the Allies were landing all their supplies, and this was the cause of the battles of Balaclava and Inkerman. There was some serious flawed Allied generalship, most famously the unsuccessful Charge of the British Light Brigade at Balaclava into the face of Russian artillery on 25 October 1854. Moreover, Lord Raglan’s (1788–1855) frequent and mistaken description of the French allies as ‘the enemy’ was an example of decrepitude. The diseased squalor in the entrenchments outside Sevastopol was less dramatic than poor generalship, but even more deadly.

  Victory was eventually won with the capture of Sevastopol, but at a heavy cost. As a result, the Crimean War offers an instructive parallel with the First World War, both of which are generally seen in terms of folly, futility and horror. The terrible conditions of the troops in the Crimean War, especially a lack of adequate food, clean water, medical attention, shelter and clothing, helped lead to very heavy losses from disease, and the administrative deficiencies were bitterly criticized in Parliament and the press. During the war as a whole, about 3,000 British troops were killed in action, but 19,000 died of disease, exposure or infected wounds, leading to great prominence being given to Florence Nightingal
e’s organization of nursing for sick troops. As in the First World War, only a brief conflict was anticipated, and there were no adequate preparations, not least in strategic and tactical doctrine. In practice, the multiple weaknesses of Russia as a military power were important to British success, while, underwritten by the strength of the economy, the British Army made improvements. In 1855, better transport, medical provisions and logistics helped the Army’s health.

  The Treaty of Paris of 1856 achieved Allied war goals by severely limiting Russian naval forces on the Black Sea, but Russia was able to resume expansion at the expense of the Turks in the 1870s. The British deficiencies highlighted by the war, and the accompanying furore, led to a measure of reform, notably in Army administration, that, in part, reflected impulses already present before the conflict.

  The Indian Mutiny of 1857–9 was triggered by the British demand that their Indian soldiers use cartridges greased in animal tallow for their new Enfield rifles, a measure that was widely unacceptable for religious reasons; although there was a concerted plan for mutiny before this issue arose. The Indian troops at Meerut mutinied on 10 May 1857, and the next day mutineers took over Delhi, proclaiming the Mughal Bahadur Shah sovereign. Fortunately for the British, much of the Indian Army remained loyal, including the Madras Army in the south and most of the Bombay area. The Punjab remained under control, and the rulers of Hyderabad, Kashmir and Nepal provided assistance. However, most of the Bengal Army in the Ganges Valley mutinied. British failures to regain control – Delhi was not retaken swiftly and on 29 June an attack on mutineers near Chinhat was defeated – helped the Mutiny to gather momentum.

  Yet, the movement of troops and cannon from outside the rebellious area helped the British regain the initiative. On 14 September 1857, Delhi was stormed and, although there were heavy British losses in street-fighting, the city was cleared by 20 September. In November, the garrison at Lucknow was relieved and then the British made a safe withdrawal from it. The following spring, the British were able to overrun the rebellious area. On 21 March 1858, Lucknow was recaptured, and in May and June the key region of Awadh (Oudh) was cleared, while Sir Hugh Rose regained control of central India.

  The rising was suppressed by British and loyal Indian troops, especially Gurkhas and Sikhs, in the largest deployment of British forces since the Napoleonic Wars ended at Waterloo in 1815 and before the Boer War of 1899–1902. No major Indian prince joined the rising, which also had no foreign support. Moreover, sheer fighting determination was important to British success. Writing to his parents from Cawnpore, a centre of the rebellion, Lieutenant Hugh Pearce Pearson of the 84th Foot noted that the rebels did not dare ‘charge our little squares with their clouds of cavalry’, a description which apparently paints a clear picture of the superiority of British fighting methods, but he continued ‘They had most magnificent gunners’. These two remarks indicate the danger of selective quotation.

  The Mutiny led, in 1858 by the India Act, to the end of rule by the East India Company and, instead, to the direct administration by the British government of that part of India that was not left under dependent local princes, a system that continued until the country gained independence in 1947. As a result of the Mutiny, the British also became more cautious in their treatment of Indian opinion, not least in their willingness to consider unwelcome reforms. This was more significant because the empire focused on India, which was its most populous part and the basis of much of its power, especially its ability to act as a force on land.

  Caution owed something to the bitterness and racial violence of the struggle, and the long-standing images of cruelty it provoked. For the British, this was the case with mutineers massacring women, children and prisoners at Cawnpore in 1857. In contrast, Colin Campbell’s (1792–1863) ability to lead a column to the relief of Lucknow later that year became a totemic occasion of Victorian soldiering and served as a model for subsequent actions, while Henry Havelock (1795–1857) and other commanders demonstrated successful Christian militarism.

  However, there were alternative images of cruelty, with British troops killing captured mutineers, most dramatically by strapping them across the muzzles of cannon which were then fired. Pearson wrote in August 1857 that the British forces had taken very heavy casualties, adding,

  … village fighting … desperate … we took two sepoy prisoners the other day and they were blown away from the guns: the stink of fresh flesh was sickening in the extreme, but I have seen so many disgusting sights and so much bloodshed that I have grown quite callous.

  In modern India, the Mutiny has been reinterpreted, somewhat anachronistically, as India’s first war of independence or nationalism, and is now widely referred to as the ‘Rebellion’.

  The challenges of the 1850s prefigured those the empire was to face from 1939, but the latter were more serious, in strategic and security terms, not least with the German assault on the British Isles, and also in so far as the stability and continuity of imperial rule were concerned: the empire was largely gone within three decades of the outbreak of the Second World War. In contrast, the British empire overcame the challenges of the 1850s and expanded thereafter.

  After the Crimean War, Britain did not fight another European power until the First World War broke out in 1914. There was repeated concern about the danger of conflict with France and Russia, and fears of invasion from France led to the construction of defensive positions, such as the Needles Old Battery on the Isle of Wight, as well as to the central emphasis on maintaining the world’s leading navy. In the event, however, competition with other European powers stopped short of war, and only encouraged the drive to empire. As yet, Germany, Italy, Japan and the US were not mounting a serious naval or imperial challenge.

  1860–99

  There were still limits to British power. Given the strength of its possible opponents and the limits to what could be achieved by the Royal Navy when up against a Continental power, it would have been unwise to intervene in the American Civil War or the German unification driven by Prussia that had led, in 1866, to the annexation of Hanover (which was ruled by Queen Victoria’s first cousin); but the strength of other powers did not yet pose a serious challenge to British interests. There was repeated concern about Russia’s advance into Central Asia and the apparent threat it posed to the security of India, but the international situation appeared relatively benign and, with its rapidly growing economy, Britain could act as a major power without too great an impact on its public finances or society.

  This situation helped ensure that the Navy in the 1870s displayed scant improvement in organization, technology or doctrine, while the Army did not seek to emulate German capabilities, for example with annual manoeuvres or a planning department. Britain indeed was a great power on the cheap, a situation that was not sustainable, but one that looked towards the later cheap hawkery of seeking a major role but being unwilling to accept the consequences, a situation very much seen over the last decade.

  Once the Mutiny was suppressed, India returned to its former role as a key support for British power elsewhere, including China, where the Second Opium War began in 1857. In 1860, Beijing was captured, the role of Sikh cavalry supported by Armstrong artillery showing the combination of imperial manpower and home industry in the spread of British power.

  In the 1860s and 1870s, the pace of expansion increased. None of the conflicts in which Britain was involved was a war of survival (for Britain) and none transformed British society, but their cumulative impact for Britain was important, and their individual impact on other societies was formative. Native resistance was overcome in New Zealand, although the Maoris used well-sited trench and pa (fort) systems that were difficult to bombard or storm, and inflicted serious defeats on the British. The availability of British colonial and allied Maori units, and the consequences of road and fort construction, ensured an eventual settlement on British terms.

  In Africa, Lagos was annexed in 1861, and, although an expedition against one of
the more powerful African people, the Asante, was wrecked by disease in 1864, in 1873–4 a fresh expedition under Garnet Wolseley was more successful. He benefited from the assistance of other African peoples, especially the Fante, but his superior firepower – Gatling machine guns, breach-loading rifles, and seven-pounder artillery – was crucial.

  Another major African kingdom, Abyssinia (Ethiopia), was brought low in 1868. In a methodically planned campaign, an expedition entered the Red Sea, landed and marched from the coast into the mountains – a formidable logistical task – defeated the Abyssinians at Arogee, stormed the fortress of Magdala, and rescued the imprisoned British hostages who were the cause of the crisis, before withdrawing. The campaign helped boost confidence in the military and reflected the growing strategic importance of the region for British power. This was to be further enhanced by the opening of the British-run Suez Canal in 1869, which greatly cut the steaming distance to India and the Far East. The Abyssinian campaign drew on the resources of the empire in India, an example of the reinforcing nature of the empire at this time.

  Meanwhile, the organization of the Army was being transformed as a result of the Cardwell reforms. As Secretary of State for the Colonies (1864–6), Edward Cardwell (1813–86) withdrew regular troops from colonies that were not willing to pay for them, a key move towards colonial self-defence, and as Secretary of State for War (1869–74) he pushed through the ending of the purchase of commissions, instead insisting on appointment and promotion by merit and selection. This, however, did not transform the social composition of the officer corps, which remained an admixture of landed elite and professional groups, with particular commitment derived from the extent to which many officers were themselves the sons of officers, a frequent pattern in a society in which far more people followed their parents in employment and place of residence than is the case today. Cardwell’s failure to increase pay ensured that officers still had to be men of means, however.